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Fees, Incentives and Deterrence:
A Reply to Professor Fitzpatrick
Linda Sandstrom Simard 1
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Undaunted by the common refrain accusing class action lawyers of
collecting astronomical fees while class members walk away with almost
nothing, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick serves as provocateur in
asserting that lawyers should receive higher fees and class members
should receive less compensation in small-stakes class actions. 2
Although the proposal is seemingly outrageous in light of public
opinion, it is theoretically appealing for several reasons. First, to
the extent that the proposal seeks to prioritize deterrence, it is
consistent with the enhancement of individual welfare. 3 A system that
deploys scarce resources to prevent, rather than insure, wrongful
1F
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1

Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School

2

Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Protection of Investors in the Wake of the 20082009 Financial Crisis: Do Class Actions Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158
U. Penn. L. Rev. 2043, 2047 (2010)("the optimal award of fees to class
action lawyers in small stakes actions is 100% of judgment.") The
phrase "small-stakes class action" typically refers to a class action
joining together claims that cannot be economically litigated on an
individual basis. Tobias B. Wolf, Federal Jurisdiction and Due
Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2035, 2088 (2008). Damages for the individual claims may range from
almost nothing to several thousand dollars.

3

Class action litigation serves dual functions: minimization of
accident costs through prevention of unreasonable risk (deterrence)
and compensation for injuries caused by reasonable risk (insurance).
David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in
Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 U. Va. L. Rev. 1871,1873
(2002). Fitzpatrick asserts that the insurance function is not
relevant in small stakes class actions and therefore we should seek to
maximize deterrence.
1
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conduct is better for everyone. 4 Second, Fitzpatrick’s proposal
significantly reduces agency costs associated with the attorney/class
relationship, thus increasing the efficiency of adjudicatory
regulation. 5 Indeed, if the entire judgment is awarded as fees, agency
costs are all but eliminated. Third, Fitzpatrick’s proposal
streamlines the process for class certification because typicality and
adequacy of representation become irrelevant when class members have
no skin in the game. 6 Finally, the proposal is appealing because it
offers a normative justification for the award of fees, something that
is often absent under the existing fee setting regime.
Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal raises some serious
questions.
3F
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Professor David Marcus identifies a number of problems that
hinder any serious consideration of the proposal. 7 Specifically,
Marcus questions whether the proposal would pass muster under existing
doctrinal constraints imposed by the Rules Enabling Act and the law of
unjust enrichment. 8 He also takes issue with Fitzpatrick's premise
that full enforcement of substantive law necessarily increases social
welfare, instead suggesting that procedural law may be an effective
vehicle for fine tuning the regulatory force of substantive law. 9
Overall, Marcus believes that the social legitimacy of the class
6F

7F

8F

4

Id. at 1890(the costs of preventing unreasonable risk are lower than
the costs of compensating for the loss that arises from unreasonable
risk.)

5

Agency costs arise in the context of class action litigation when
class members lack the ability and incentive to monitor the lawyer's
actions, thus creating a risk that class action attorneys will serve
their own interests at the expense of the class. See Jonathan R.
Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Role in Class Actions and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1991)

6

See id. at 6(when class action attorneys purchase class members'
claims, typicality and adequacy of representation become irrelevant).

7

David Marcus, Attorney’s Fees and the Social Legitimacy of Class
Actions, 159 U. Penn. L. Rev. (PENNumbra) 157 (2011).

8

Id at 159-60.

9

Id. at 161-63.
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action device will decline sharply if Fitzpatrick’s proposal is
adopted. 10
9F

While Professor Marcus persuasively presents each of his
arguments, he overlooks two fundamental questions: (1) how much more
deterrence can we expect to derive from an increase in fees to class
action lawyers?; 11and (2) what are the costs associated with a
significant increase in small-stakes class actions? The following
analysis suggests that the increase in deterrence may be far
outweighed by the increase in cost associated with the proposal.
10F

Fitzpatrick's proposal rests upon an assertion that deterrence is
the sole purpose of small-stakes class actions, at least from a
social-welfarist utilitarian perspective. 12 In order to maximize
deterrence, we should incentivize lawyers to file more small-stakes
class actions by allocating a greater proportion of class awards to
fees. 13 An increase in the number of filings will result in more class
awards and more deterrence.
11F

12F

To test the logic of the proposal, we must begin with the basic
theory of deterrence: when an actor is threatened with liability for
its harmful conduct in an amount that correlates to the extent of
injury caused by the conduct, the actor will have an incentive to take

10

Id. at 163-66.

11

Id. at 161 (Professor Marcus touches the issue only lightly when
he raises the possibility that a risk averse plaintiff's lawyer might
accept a settlement offer that is well below the amount of injury
caused to the class, thus reducing the overall payout by the defendant
and the deterrent effect of the litigation).
12

Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2067 (“Small-stakes class actions
serve no insurance function because individuals are not risk averse
with respect to small losses. … In fact, when the administrative
costs and profit margins of providing insurance are added to the
equation, it is actually irrational for individuals to buy insurance
against small losses for which they are not risk averse.” ).
13

Professor Fitzpatrick suggests that “every additional dollar given
to plaintiffs instead of their attorneys will decrease the level of
deterrence even further from the optimum.” Fitzpatrick, supra note 1,
at 2062.
3
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precautions to avoid the injury. 14 Thus, if an actor is faced with a
choice between two actions, one that is socially optimal (such as
investing in precautions to reduce the risk of injury) and another
that is socially suboptimal (failing to take precautions), the actor
will have an incentive to take the optimal action if the expected
liability from taking the suboptimal action exceeds the cost of the
optimal action. 15 The deterrent value of threatened litigation,
therefore, is equal to the expected loss from the litigation.
Whether litigation is actually filed or not, the actor will be
motivated to invest in precautions if it believes that a credible
threat of litigation exists. 16
13F

14F

15F

The motivation to invest in deterrence hinges upon the
credibility of the threat of litigation. If an actor believes that
14

Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1912. Under this theory, the actor
“aggregates all possible accident scenarios and all possible marginal
investments in precautions. If appropriately motivated, the [actor]
will take precautions to the point that maximizes aggregate welfare,
that is, the point at which the aggregate cost of making an additional
unit of investment in precautions would exceed the aggregate benefit
from avoiding the corresponding aggregate unit of accident risk. The
[actor] cannot know or predict how or to what degree contemplated
conduct will benefit or harm any particular individual in the
potentially affected population. The possibilities are infinite and
are ‘knowable’ only as statistically weighted probabilities.”)
15

For example, an actor may expect an aggregate injury of $5,000,000
if it fails to invest in precautions, or zero if it invests in
precautions. Assuming a class action will have an 80% chance of
success for the plaintiff, the actor will expect a loss of $4,000,000
if it fails to invest in precautions and zero if it invests in
precautions. Thus, if the cost of the precaution is less than
$4,000,000 a rational actor would choose to invest in precautions to
avoid the threat of litigation. As the probability of success by the
class decreases, the actor's expected loss will decrease and the
deterrent value of the threatened litigation will decrease.
16

The deterrent value of threatened litigation is dependent upon the
ex ante calculation of expected loss, not the actual loss incurred
when litigation is filed. Of course, if the actor finds that its
estimates are materially wrong, subjecting it to more or less of a
loss than expected, the actor may be motivated to refine its methods
of calculation for future decisions regarding potential injury.
4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1832828

litigation is not likely to be filed or that the plaintiff is unlikely
to succeed on the merits, the actor is less likely to invest in
deterrence than if she believes that litigation is likely to be filed
and the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. To the extent
that small-stakes litigation is not economically viable on an
individual basis, these claims create no credible threat of litigation
and no incentive to invest in deterrence. When a lawyer takes on a
group of small-stakes claims and certifies a class action, however,
these claims create a credible threat of litigation and a
corresponding incentive to invest in deterrence. Thus, an actor
choosing between socially optimal or socially suboptimal conduct will
anticipate a lawyer’s incentive to file a class action suit by
calculating whether the expected return to the attorney will equal or
exceed the expected costs of bringing suit. 17
16F

Under the existing fee regime, a credible threat of litigation
exists for all class actions that offer an expected fee in excess of
expected costs. If we assume a fee award of 25% of a judgment or
settlement 18 and costs in the range of $500,000, economic viability is
dependent upon the probability of success on the merits and the amount
in controversy. For example, a class action seeking less than
$2,000,000 is unlikely to be economically viable; a class action
17F

17

Assuming the attorney's fee is calculated as a percent of the fund,
the incentive to file can be represented by the following formula:
c < f * p * l
where:
c = total costs (including opportunity costs to the attorney as
measured by the value the attorney places on his or her time)
f = fee percentage awarded to attorney's fees
p = probability of success by the class
l = aggregate recovery
In an efficient market, the attorney's expected return should equal
the expected costs; when the expected return exceeds the attorney's
expected costs, the attorney receives excess profits. Macey and
Miller, supra note 4, at 24.
18

Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2046 (under the existing regime, fees
have coalesced around 25%).
5
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seeking $2,500,000 will be viable if the probability of success is 80%
or higher; and a class action seeking $4,500,000 will be viable if the
probability of success is 45% or higher. Class actions that offer a
positive return under the existing fee setting regime pose a credible
threat of litigation and a corresponding incentive to invest in
deterrence. Increasing the fee awarded in these actions will not
increase deterrence – it will merely increase the amount of excess
profit to attorneys. 19
18F

To the extent that the Fitzpatrick proposal seeks to increase
deterrence by increasing the number of small-stakes class actions
filed, we must consider the deterrence derived from "new" class
actions -- those that are not economically viable to a lawyer under
the existing fee regime but will become economically viable with the
added benefit of a larger fee. 20 If we assume a fee award of 100% of a
judgment or settlement 21 and costs in the range of $500,000, a class
action seeking $2,000,000 will become economically viable under the
19F

20F

19

Macey and Miller, supra note 4, at 59-60("the percentage of fund
method [for calculating attorneys' fees] results in systematic excess
profits for plaintiff's attorneys -- returns beyond what the attorney
would earn in an efficiently functioning market.")
20

This group of “new” class actions can be defined as class actions
that offer: (1) an expected return that is less than the attorney's
expected costs under the existing fee regime; and (2) an expected
return that exceeds the attorney's expected costs under the proposed
regime. This can be represented by the formula:
fe * pp * l

< c < fp

*

pp

*

l

where:
fe = fee percentage awarded to attorney's fees under the
existing fee regime
pp =

probability of success by class

l

= aggregate recovery

c

= total costs

fp = fee percentage awarded to attorney's fees under the
Fitzpatrick proposal
21

Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 2046-47.
6
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Fitzpatrick proposal when the probability of success is between 25% 100% 22; a class action seeking $2,500,000 will become viable under the
proposal when the probability of success is between 20% - 80% 23; and a
class action seeking $4,500,000 will become viable under the proposal
if the probability of success is between 12% - 45% 24. Overall, the
Fitzpatrick proposal will create an incentive for lawyers to file new
class actions, many of which will offer a lower probability of success
than the class actions that are economically viable under the existing
fee regime.
21F

22F

23F

As the probability of success by the plaintiff class decreases,
the expected loss from the threatened litigation decreases, and the ex
ante deterrent value decreases. 25 To the extent that the Fitzpatrick
proposal encourages lawyers to file new class actions that offer a
relatively high probability of success to the class, we are likely to
derive a correspondingly healthy increase in deterrence from the
threat of these suits. 26 To the extent that the proposal encourages
lawyers to file weak small-stakes class actions, however, we are
likely to derive a correspondingly weak deterrent value from the
threat of these suits. 27 While it is impossible to determine the
precise increase in deterrence that will be derived from the threat of
24F

25F

26F

22

Claims seeking less than $2,000,000 are often not economically
viable under the existing regime.
23

Claims seeking $2,500,000 are viable under the existing fee regime
if the probability of success is 80% or higher and therefore they
already pose a credible threat of litigation without the added benefit
of an increase in fees.
24

Claims seeking $4,500,000 are viable under the existing fee regime
if the probability of success is 45% or higher and therefore they
already pose a credible threat of litigation without the added benefit
of an increase in fees.
25

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

26

For example, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class
actions seeking between $1,000,000 and $2,000,000 that offer a 50% or
greater probability of success.
27

For example, the Fitzpatrick proposal may encourage new class
actions seeking $5,000,000 and offering a probability of success to
the class of 15-20%.
7
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new class actions, it is clear that we will derive diminishing returns
on deterrence as weaker class actions are filed.
Assuming that some increase in deterrence will arise from the
proposed increase in fees, we must weigh the value of the increase in
deterrence against the costs associated with the proposal. On a
systemic level, the increased return to plaintiffs lawyers in smallstakes class actions will result in a redistribution of legal
services. Lawyers seeking to maximize the return on the investment of
their time will divert legal services away from other types of cases
in order to pursue small-stakes class actions. Indeed, in light of
the dramatic disparity that will exist between small-stakes class
actions and other types of legal services, the litigation explosion
cliche may become a reality. 28 There is no evidence that our judicial
system is prepared to absorb these extra demands. Moreover, class
action lawyers motivated by the possibility of collecting 100% of a
large award are likely to pursue a victory with intensity. In an
effort to increase the probability of a successful outcome, lawyers
are likely to invest extra time, depose more witnesses, hire more
experts or investigators, or serve more discovery. 29 This increased
intensity is likely to be most pronounced in the weakest cases.
Defendants, faced with a formidable opponent, may dig their heels in
and further intensify the battle, creating a cross current of
effects. 30 Alternatively, defendants may choose to avoid the battle
entirely by buying out the plaintiff class lawyer. Even very weak
claims may offer a sizable return to the plaintiff class lawyer if the
downside risk to the defendant could be catastrophic. 31 Overall, the
27F

28F

29F

30F

28

See Arthur Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation
Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day
in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982 (2003).
29

Choi and Sanchirico, Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose?
Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling,
33 J. Legal Studies 323, 325-26 (2004) (higher stakes are associated
with higher intensity of litigation effort).
30

Id. at 327.

31

See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir.
1995)(defendants “settle even if they have no legal liability,”
rather than “stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury
trial”).
8
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systemic costs associated with the proposal are likely to exceed the
increase in deterrence derived from new class actions.
Conclusion
The Fitzpatrick proposal is theoretically enticing because it is
easy to apply, it reduces concerns about adequacy of representation,
and it provides a normative rationale for the award of class action
fees. Notwithstanding these benefits, the proposal has serious
drawbacks. Although the threat of a large increase in the number of
small-stakes class actions is likely to give rise to an increase in
deterrence, the gains in deterrence will depend upon the strength of
the cases that are filed. If the proposal allows weak class actions
to become economically viable, the increase in deterrence may be much
smaller than we hope. Indeed, the increase in deterrence may be
dwarfed by the systemic costs associated with the proposal. Moreover,
this proposal incentivizes lawyers to invest in small-stakes class
actions over alternative legal services. Even if this proposal will
increase deterrence to some degree, we must consider whether the
redress of small-stakes injuries deserves such a tremendous investment
of society's legal resources.

9
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